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I. Introduction 
“You going to pay for this shit you’re doing. I don't give a fuck 
if you call the cops or not. Fuck them. Fuck the cops. Fuck the 
Judge. Fuck your God damn lawyer, period.”1 This is one of the 
many threatening messages Eric Nolen left on his ex-girlfriend’s 
voicemail three hours before showing up at her house and 
attacking her.2 After leaving this message, Nolen drove to his ex-
girlfriend’s house and brutally attacked her; Nolen forced his ex-
girlfriend to the ground, kicked her fifteen to twenty times in the 
chest and abdomen, and caused her to urinate on herself.3 
Throughout the attack the victim was screaming so loud that 
multiple neighbors came to the scene and witnessed the abuse.4 
As a result, the victim was left with a bloody lip, large bruises on 
her chest and abdomen, and bruises on her face in the shape of a 
shoeprint.5 In the voicemail message, Nolen was referring to his 
disregard for the protection order that his ex-girlfriend of 
fourteen years had received approximately two weeks before the 
encounter.6 Following the incident, Nolen was arrested and 
                                                                                                     
 1. Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 
920 (Va. 2009) (No. 2422-07-1), 2008 WL 6913864, at *1. 
 2. Id. at 3–5. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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convicted after a bench trial for felonious violation of a protection 
order.7 
This is the typical situation where a protection order must be 
fully and rigorously enforced in order to protect a woman8 who is 
the victim of an abusive relationship.9 In contrast, consider Mark 
Hunt’s arrest for his violation of a protection order.10 On 
February 16, 2010, Stephanie Hunt obtained a protection order 
against her husband that prevented Mark from having any 
                                                                                                     
 7. Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Va. 2009). 
 8. For the purpose of uniformity, this Note refers to the petitioner as 
female and the respondent as male because this is the traditional situation in 
which reports of abuse arise, with the male as the batterer and the female as 
the victim. See Linda M. Peterman & Charlotte G. Dixon, Assessment and 
Evaluation of Men Who Batter Women, J. OF REHABILITATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 38 
(“[I]t has been reported . . . that the male is the abuser in 95% of domestic 
violence cases . . . .”). There has been a trend in recent years that more men are 
becoming the victims of abuse. See Bert H. Hoff, US National Survey: More Men 
Than Women Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 4 J. OF AGGRESSION, 
CONFLICT & PEACE RES. 155, 155 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ 
17596591211244166 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (finding more men than women 
had been abused in 2011, with “an estimated 5,365,000 men and 4,741,000 
women [as] victims of intimate partner physical violence” in the last year) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally, studies have 
shown “that domestic violence occurs in same-sex relationships at 
approximately the same rate as it does in heterosexual relationships,” meaning 
the petitioner and the respondent could be members of the same sex. Ronald F. 
Bobner, Amy J. Miller & John W. Zarski, Sexual Identity Development: A Base 
for Work with Same-Sex Couple Partner Abuse, 22 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY 189, 
189 (2000).  
 9. Recent studies have shown that a higher number of women act as the 
primary perpetrator than previously thought. These studies illustrate the 
difficulty of implementing a one-sided protection order when there is mutual 
abuse within the relationship. See Irene Hanson Frieze & Maureen C. McHugh, 
Intimate Partner Violence: New Directions, 1087 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 121, 
132 (2006) (examining a study of heterosexual couples in stable relationships 
and finding “[m]ore men than women reported being the targets of one-sided 
violence, and more women than men reported being the violent one in the 
couple”); Suzanne C. Swan et al., National Institute of Health, A Review of 
Research on Women’s Use of Violence with Male Intimate Partners, 23 VIOLENCE 
& VICTIMS 301, 313 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 
2968709/pdf/nihms244725.pdf (illustrating the prevalence of women abusers 
and the need for interventions to examine the circumstances of abuse rather 
than assuming typical patterned abuse). 
 10. State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 
19, 2012). 
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contact with Stephanie.11 A little over a month later, Stephanie 
began “ha[ving] trouble breathing and walking up the stairs, 
vomited, and may have had pneumonia.”12 While it is not clear 
how the couple came into contact, the couple used the 
speakerphone function of Mark’s phone to contact the district 
court and request information on how to end the protection order 
so that Mark could help Stephanie.13 Following this call, Mark 
drove Stephanie to the hospital, where she received prescription 
medicine to assist with her symptoms.14 Stephanie acknowledged 
that she could have taken a taxi or bus to the hospital rather 
than relying on Mark,15 but she wanted to get the protection 
order dropped because “she was afraid she would end up in the 
hospital . . . and there would be no one to take care of their 
children except for [Mark].”16 
Following the visit to the hospital, Mark and Stephanie went 
to the district court to remove the protection order.17 It became 
clear that Stephanie was not ready to have the order removed 
when she began crying in front of an administrative assistant in 
the courthouse.18 The assistant then had Mark Hunt arrested,19 
charged with a violation of a protection order, and eventually 
convicted and sentenced to six months of probation.20 
These two scenarios illustrate the stark difference in 
circumstances that can lead to a protection order violation. Eric 
Nolen’s actions are the perfect example of a situation where 
protection orders and the violations that result are the necessary 
and appropriate penalty for the abuser.21 Nolen contacted his ex-
                                                                                                     
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Brief of Appellee at 1, State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535 
(Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012). 
 17. Brief of Appellant at 7–8, Hunt, 2012 WL 3966535. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief of Appellee at 2–3, Hunt, 2012 WL 3966535. 
 20. Id. at 4. 
 21. Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 
920, 921 (Va. 2009) (No. 2422-07-1), 2008 WL 6913864, at *1. 
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girlfriend without being provoked and arrived at her house to 
severely beat her.22 He chose to blatantly disregard the legal 
protection in order to abuse his former girlfriend.23 There was no 
excuse or defense to his actions, and his punishment was 
appropriate.24  
In contrast, Mark Hunt’s actions question the enforcement 
mechanisms of the protection order system.25 On paper, Hunt 
violated the protection order, but a full look at the circumstances 
of the violation and arrest highlights how blameless his actions 
truly were.26 Although the court did the right thing in not 
removing the protection order, the conviction of Hunt was an 
improper penalty for his actions.27 The couple was still married, 
and both parties likely still had feelings for each other, making it 
very difficult for Hunt not to volunteer to help his wife and 
mother of his son to the hospital.28  
Civil protection orders29 are the leading tool in preventing 
the maltreatment of women in abusive relationships, offering an 
effective and low-cost solution to the hardship of domestic 
violence.30 These orders are designed to protect the victim of an 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Nolen v. Commonwealth, 673 S.E.2d 920, 921 (Va. 2009) (affirming 
Nolen’s conviction for felonious violation of a protection order). 
 25. See State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Sept. 7, 2012) (determining that Stephanie sought assistance from Mark in 
getting to the hospital when she was suffering from symptoms of pneumonia). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at *4 (“Stephanie had obtained the protection order without 
Mark’s help, and she could have sought its modification or removal without his 
help.”). 
 28. See id. at *1 (“[T]hey were afraid that Mark wouldn’t be allowed to care 
for the children if Stephanie were seriously ill, perhaps hospitalized . . . .”). 
 29. There are many names given to protection orders that are often used 
interchangeably. These include: no-contact order, stay-away order, restraining 
order, harassment order, and order for protection among others. VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RES., http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/survivor 
brochure/survivorbrochure.html#id56863 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Unless otherwise mentioned in the text, 
this Note will use the term “protection order” to encompass all of these possible 
terms. 
 30. See T.K. Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Orders Effective in 
Stopping or Reducing Partner Violence, CARSEY INST. 1, 1 (2011), 
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abusive relationship, while also penalizing the perpetrator for his 
criminal actions.31 The law of domestic violence has worked 
diligently to create safeguards from this violence, but as the law 
develops, there is a need to recognize the changing dynamics of 
society.  
The problem with the current approach is that not all 
abusive relationships are one sided, and while one partner may 
be considered the victim, there is often a more complex story, 
sometimes involving mutual abuse.32 A civil protection order is 
effective in the traditional model of abuse where there is one 
abuser and one victim; however, some abusive relationships 
involve mutual abuse and manipulation, which cannot be 
remedied in the same manner.33 Although the actions of the 
protected party may only play a role in the violation in the small 
minority of cases, there is still a need to analyze this grey area 
where the protected party has played too egregious of a role to go 
unnoticed.34 This Note highlights the discrepancies in the courts’ 
approach to assessing and sanctioning protection order violations, 
                                                                                                     
http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-Logan-Civil-Protective-
Order.pdf (“Civil protective orders are effective in reducing partner violence for 
many women. For half the women in the sample, a protective order stopped the 
violence. For the other half, the orders significantly reduced violence and 
abuse.”); Jeremy Travis, Department of Justice, Civil Protection Orders: Victim’s 
Views on Effectiveness, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., Jan. 1998, at 2 (analyzing a study 
of women who had sought protection orders and finding that seventy-two 
percent of participants felt their life had improved, “more than 90 percent 
reported feeling better about themselves, and 80 percent felt safer”). 
 31. See Tara L. Cornelius, Allison Kunde & Ryan C. Shorey, Legal 
Consequences of Dating Violence: A Critical Review and Directions for Improved 
Behavioral Contingencies, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 194, 199 (2009) 
(describing the advantages of civil protection orders “including increasing safety 
of the primary victim, potentially deterring future violence, and providing the 
victim with some degree of control over the aberrant situation”). 
 32. See id. at 202 (“[T]he vast majority of dating violence involves mutual 
violence, such that an individual likely has experienced both victimization and 
perpetration . . . .”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. In a study conducted of 663 protection orders taken out in the Qunicy 
Court of Massachusetts in 1990, 48.4% of the abusers re-abused their victim 
within two years of the issuance of a protection order. Andrew R. Klein, Re-
Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers, in DO ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996). 
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and advocates for a nuanced assessment of violations, rather 
than simply punishing the supposed abuser automatically. 
To set the background for obtaining and enforcing a 
protection order, Part II of this Note provides information on how 
a petitioner obtains an order, the relief available from the court, 
the possible duration of orders, and the procedure for enforcing 
and processing a violation of a protection order.35  
Part III explores the injustice of the current system, looking 
specifically at how the petitioner’s role in the violation is 
considered when sanctioning the respondent.36 Protection orders 
are structured so that one person is forbidden from making 
contact, while the other has no restrictions placed on 
communicating.37 This structure leaves the victim free to contact 
the restrained party, while the restrained party can be arrested 
for even the slightest contact.38 With this framework, the victim 
has been given a free pass to contact her abuser, and even invite 
him to come over, without being penalized.39 This Part will 
examine the flaws of this system, advocating for a greater 
emphasis on the female petitioner’s role in the violation, while 
also finding a balance between her fragile state and the possible 
abuse of the respondent.40 
Part IV looks at the legal system’s current approach to the 
problems of inducement.41 Additionally, this Part will look at the 
                                                                                                     
 35. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the system of obtaining and 
enforcing a protection order). 
 36. See infra Part III (analyzing the problems with the current enforcement 
of protection orders when a respondent was enticed into coming into contact). 
 37. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012) (providing the restrictions that can 
be placed on the respondent to a protection order); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2012) 
(listing the restraints that can be placed on the respondent); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 42-924.03 (2012) (stating that a respondent may not receive a protection order 
unless they file their own complaint or the court finds evidence supporting the 
issuance of a protection order against the petitioner). 
 38. See KEITH GUZIK, ARRESTING ABUSE 44 (2009) (recounting a case where 
the petitioner reached out to the respondent to remove his belongings from their 
shared home and upon arrival was arrested for violating the protection order).  
 39. See id. (“This happens all the time. Girls call a guy over when a no-
contact order is in effect. He comes over and she calls the cops.”). 
 40. See infra Part III (analyzing the rationale behind the protection of the 
woman and considering the role of battered women’s syndrome in the process). 
 41. See infra Part IV (examining different state court’s approaches to the 
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possibility of mutual protection orders as a solution to this 
problem.42 This Note recognizes the flaws of mutual protection 
orders—including the risk of nonenforcement, the possible 
violation of due process, and the psychological effects that a 
mutual protection order might have on both the respondent and 
the petitioner—and rejects this option as a solution to the 
problem of inducement.43  
Part V suggests more constructive solutions to the injustice, 
seeking a balance between a woman’s enticement of the 
respondent into a violation, and the respondent’s possible abuse 
of the system.44 This Part looks at how the implementation of a 
new judicial mechanism, that comes into play after a violation 
has occurred, can help to remedy the issue of unjust 
enforcement.45 
II. Background 
Protection orders are civil remedies that provide protection to 
a victim of domestic violence by requiring the respondent to stay 
away from the petitioner.46 This protection is offered by statute in 
all fifty states, with most states having the option of issuing 
temporary or emergency protection orders, as well as permanent 
                                                                                                     
victim’s role in the violation and the backlash that some of these decisions have 
created). 
 42. A mutual protection order prevents both parties from contacting each 
other, sometimes without requiring a mutual showing of abuse. See Catherine 
F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders 
Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 266 (1996) (“A 
mutual protection order is an order entered against both parties, requiring both 
to abide by the restraints and other forms of relief in the civil protection order.”). 
 43. See infra Part IV.D.2 (looking at how courts and scholars have 
approached the problem currently and seeking to find a trend in what is the 
appropriate remedy for the injustice). 
 44. See infra Part V (exploring possible solutions to the inequity that 
results when a respondent comes into contact with his victim after being 
repeatedly provoked). 
 45. Infra Part V. 
 46. See DIANE KIESEL, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
1077 (2007) (explaining the purpose and process of attaining a protection order). 
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protection orders.47 To receive protection, the victim petitions the 
court for a formal order that will prohibit the abuser from 
contacting the victim for a certain period of time.48 This provides 
the woman with the independence to decide whether she needs 
protection, as well as providing protection “whether or not [her] 
abuser[] face[s] criminal charges.”49 Each state has its own 
procedure and requirements for obtaining a protection order, as 
well as variations in the relief, duration, and sanctions 
available.50 
A. Requirements for Obtaining an Order of Protection 
To obtain a protection order, the victim must file a petition in 
court, typically in the family division of a civil court.51 Most states 
require that the victim have a specific relationship with her 
abuser to qualify for the order.52 This relationship includes 
current and former spouses, family members related by blood, 
current or former household members, persons in intimate 
relationships, and individuals who have a child in common.53 In 
                                                                                                     
 47. Catherine F. Klein & Leslie E. Orloff, Protective Orders and Other 
Injunctive Relief: Civil Protection Orders, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW, POLICY, 
AND PRACTICE 1078, 1078 (2007) (explaining the differences between temporary 
and permanent protection orders). 
 48. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1079 (describing the process of obtaining 
a protection order). 
 49. Id.  
 50. See Protective Orders, 0080 SURVEYS 19 (Westlaw) (citing the 
statutes for obtaining a protection order for all fifty states). 
 51. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1078 (noting that most orders of 
protection are petitioned for in the “family divisions of civil court”). 
 52. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012) (requiring the respondent in a 
petition for an order of protection to be a household member); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46b-15 (2012) (requiring the abuse to have been committed “by another family 
or household member”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2010) (requiring 
the domestic violence to occur between household members); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1101(a) (2012) (requiring the abuse to occur between family or household 
members). 
 53. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1079 (listing the relationships 
normally required to attain a protection order). One of the difficulties of defining 
these relationships is determining what a statute means by “intimate 
relationship.” See Devon M. Largio, Refining the Meaning and Application of 
“Dating Relationship” Language in Domestic Violence Statutes, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
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order to make this process easier, many court systems provide 
form pleading and court mediators prior to appearing before a 
judge.54 
Following the initial petition, most jurisdictions will issue an 
ex parte temporary55 protection order. Because this is an ex parte 
petition, the respondent does not need to be present for the order 
to be issued.56 Following this issuance, the respondent will be 
served with the temporary order and notified of the court date 
when the permanent order will be issued.57 A temporary order 
normally lasts ten to twenty-one days, or until the permanent 
protection order is issued; if an emergency order is issued, it 
typically lasts seventy-two hours, but sometimes it can be as 
short as the court’s next business day.58 
                                                                                                     
939, 958–60 (2007) (explaining some of the difficulties of interpreting what a 
statute means by intimate relationship). Statutes that allow dating as one of the 
qualifying relationships often include factors that are considered when 
determining if a dating relationship exists. See id. (describing various 
requirements that states have created to help define what qualifies as an 
intimate relationship). For example, in the Vermont statute that defines a 
dating relationship, the factors include, “(A) the nature of the relationship; (B) 
the length of time the relationship has existed; (C) the frequency of interaction 
between the parties; [and] (D) the length of time since the relationship was 
terminated, if applicable.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(a) (2012). 
 54. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1080 (“Most jurisdictions provide 
form pleading to facilitate the process of petitioning for a protection order.”). 
 55. Each state has its own statute containing the requirements for 
obtaining a temporary protection order. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-
102(4)(a) (2012) (“A temporary civil protection order may be issued if the issuing 
judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger exists to the person or 
persons seeking protection under the civil protection order.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-3106(b) (2012) (“Prior to the hearing on the petition and upon a finding of 
good cause shown, the court on motion of a party may enter such temporary 
relief orders . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4(A)(1) (2012) (“Upon the filing of a 
petition for order of protection, the court shall: immediately grant an ex parte 
temporary order of protection without bond if there is probable cause . . . that an 
act of domestic abuse has occurred. . . .”). 
 56. See Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for 
Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 54 
(2000) (describing the process of obtaining a civil protection order). 
 57. See id. (providing the steps of obtaining a civil protection order). 
 58. See NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, 
PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX (2012), http://www.fullfaithandcredit.org/ 
files/bwjp/files/State%20Protection%20Order%20Duration%20Matrix%20%287-
2012%29.pdf [hereinafter PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX] (listing the 
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Once the initial order is issued, the petitioner needs to 
appear in court again to receive her final protection order.59 At 
this hearing, the respondent has the opportunity to refute any of 
the claims and present evidence demonstrating that the order is 
inappropriate.60 For a final order, most states only require the 
petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
respondent abused the petitioner in some way and the abuse is 
likely to occur again.61 If the respondent does not appear at the 
hearing, the temporary order can be extended for a specified 
amount of time, or a final order can be put in place without the 
respondent’s presence.62 This final order can last from one to five 
years,63 with some states offering permanent orders, meaning the 
respondent is indefinitely prohibited from any contact with the 
petitioner.64 
                                                                                                     
duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued in each 
state). 
 59. See Waul, supra note 56, at 54 (“The petitioner then must return to 
court to obtain the permanent order . . . and participate in a hearing where the 
respondent has the opportunity to challenge the CPO [civil protection order] 
request.”). 
 60. See id. (describing the options available to the defendant in refuting an 
order for protection). 
 61. See id. (describing the process of obtaining a civil protection order); 
A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF PROOF FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs/Standards_
of_Proof_by_State.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PROOF] 
(providing the standards of proof for each state and the corresponding statute). 
 62. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 47, at 1079 (“Courts also issue protection 
orders after full hearing, by consent, or by default.”). 
 63. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (2012) (“Any relief granted by 
the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year.”); MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01, subd. 6(b) (2012) (“Any relief granted by the order for protection shall 
be for a period not to exceed two years, except when the court determines a 
longer period is appropriate.”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2012) 
(“A[n] . . . order of protection may be effective for a maximum period of two years 
or, when aggravating circumstances are found, may be effective for a maximum 
period of five years.”). 
 64. See ALA. CODE § 50-5-7(d)(2) (2012) (“Any final protection order is of 
permanent duration unless otherwise specified or modified by a subsequent 
court order.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2012) (“These orders may be 
renewed . . . either for five years or permanently.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 1045(f) (“[T]he Court may grant no contact relief . . . for as long as reasonably 
necessary . . . up to and including the entry of a permanent order of the Court.”). 
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B. Relief Available 
Once a petitioner meets her burden of showing abuse, the 
court has broad authority to issue various forms of relief that it 
determines necessary.65 Depending on the state, relief can either 
be issued through the temporary order, or the petitioner may 
have to wait until the final protection order is issued to receive 
the full relief available.66  
This Note focuses on the relief offered by a no-contact 
provision, which forbids the respondent from making any contact 
with the petitioner, whether or not the contact involves abuse.67 
                                                                                                     
 65. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 1100 (“The scope of the relief that may be 
ordered . . . is very broad. The court has the power to do what is necessary to 
stop the family violence and keep the victims safe.”); NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION 
ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, PROTECTION ORDER RELIEF MATRIX (2012), 
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/Protection_Order_Relief_Matrix_2012.pdf 
(listing the duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued 
in each state). The respondent may be required to surrender his firearms to 
police; continue paying utility bills; move out of the shared home; refrain from 
using a shared vehicle; stay away from the school or day care center of a shared 
child; refrain from disposing of shared personal property; or comply with one of 
the many other injunctions that are available depending on the state statute. 
See id. (listing some of the nonobvious types of injunctions that a court can 
issue). 
 66. See PROTECTION ORDER DURATIONS MATRIX, supra note 58 (listing the 
duration of the various types of protection orders that can be issued in each 
state). Once a no-contact order is issued the court may provide law enforcement 
officers to assist the petitioner in removing the petitioner’s or respondent’s 
possessions from a shared household to avoid any further abuse or a violation of 
the order. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2011) (providing that the court 
may “direct[] an appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the 
petitioner to the residence to ensure that the petitioner safely obtains possession 
of the residence, automobile, or other essential personal property or to supervise 
the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of essential personal property”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2012) (stating that the court may issue “an order 
requiring that a law enforcement officer accompany either party to the residence 
or any shared business premises to supervise the removal of personal belongings 
in order to ensure the personal safety of the plaintiff when a restraining order 
has been issued”). 
 67. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (2012) (providing that one form of relief 
the court can issue is an order “prohibit[ing] the abusing party directly or 
through an agent from contacting the petitioner or victim except under specific 
conditions named in the order”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306 (2012) (listing one 
form of relief as preventing the respondent “from . . . telephoning, contacting, or 
otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, with the petitioner and any 
designated family member or specifically designated person of the respondent’s 
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Judges see this as the most effective form of preventing further 
abuse because it does not merely prevent abuse of the victim, but 
instead prevents any contact whatsoever.68 The no-contact 
provision is considered a crucial advantage of a protection order 
because it prevents the abuser from luring the victim back into 
the relationship by sending flowers or notes that will make the 
victim believe the abuser is going to change his behavior.69 These 
provisions are especially relevant because the abuser’s slightest 
communication can result in a violation of the no-contact order, 
even in situations where the victim initiates the contact.70  
C. Duration of the Order 
Once an order is issued, the order lasts for a set duration.71 
Following this time period, the petitioner can renew the order by 
offering sufficient evidence that the order is still necessary to 
prevent abuse.72 If the petitioner decides the order is no longer 
                                                                                                     
household”); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(4) (2012) (stating that the order can include 
a provision that “[r]equires the respondent to stay away from or have no contact 
with the petitioner and any other protected persons or locations”). 
 68. See A Roundtable Discussion on Domestic Violence, HOUS. LAW., 
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 24, 27 (quoting Judge Davies of the of the 177th Criminal 
District Court of Harris, Texas, as stating, “I will make a condition of that bail 
that they have no contact. . . . I don’t care if it’s a love note—you know you’re not 
going to send flowers[, y]ou’re not going to have any contact or communication 
whatsoever”). 
 69. See id. (“The ‘no contact’ order has a huge advantage because it means 
he can’t call her and tell her he loves her, and beg her to come back and do the 
honeymoon thing.”). 
 70. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ohio 2003) (finding a 
respondent in violation of a protection order even though the petitioner invited 
the respondent over to her home to celebrate their child’s birthday). 
 71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing the average length of 
a protection order). 
 72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (2012) (“Orders may be extended 
only after the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic 
violence has occurred since the entry of the order, a violation of the order has 
occurred, if the respondent consents to the extension of the order or for good 
cause shown.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2) (2012) (“The court may extend the 
order if the court, after hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to 
be heard, finds that the defendant continues to pose a threat to the safety of the 
victim, persons residing with the victim, or members of the victim’s immediate 
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necessary before the expiration of the order, she needs to formally 
have the court rescind the order.73  
Sometimes petitioners will decide to reinitiate their 
relationship with their abuser without going through the 
necessary steps to officially remove the order. This places the 
respondent at immediate risk of being held in violation of the 
order because most states do not consider reconciliation or the 
petitioner’s invitation as a defense to a violation.74 There are 
some courts that have found reconciliation and a couple’s return 
to their pre-protection order relationship renders the protection 
order null, removing the risk of penalty from both parties.75  
                                                                                                     
family.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007(2) (2012) (“[T]he court may extend an 
order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it determines 
necessary to protect the plaintiff or minor child from abuse.”). 
 73. See D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2012) (stating that a judicial officer “may, 
upon motion of any party to the original proceeding, extend, rescind, or modify 
the order for good cause shown”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6 (2012) (“Injunctive 
orders shall continue until modified or rescinded upon motion by either party or 
until the court approves a subsequent consent agreement entered into by the 
parties.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (2012) (stating that a protection order 
will last five years “unless extended, modified, vacated or rescinded upon motion 
by either party or if the court approves any consent agreement entered into by 
the plaintiff and defendant”). 
 74. See Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(determining that an invitation by the petitioner is not a defense in respondent’s 
violation of a protection order); City of N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 
1225, 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“When the General Assembly enacted this law, 
it clearly intended that the victim could not by his or her action alter the effect 
of the law. The General Assembly intended that no victim could waive the 
effects of the [protection order].”); State v. Dejarlais, 969 P.2d 90, 92 (Wash. 
1998) (finding that “consent should not be a defense to violating a domestic 
violence protection order”). 
 75. See Mohamed v. Mohamed, 557 A.2d 696, 698 (N.J. App. Div. 1989) 
(finding a protection order void because “the domestic violence action [was] 
resolved by the parties, [and] the reconciliation should end the matter [because 
t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the viability of a domestic violence 
order”). 
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D. Violation of the Order 
1. The Violation 
Once the protection order is put in place, a violation occurs 
when the respondent disregards the provisions of the order, 
typically through contact with the petitioner.76 The key 
requirement for a violation to result in a penalty is that the 
forbidden contact must be reported to the police.77 Without 
reporting, the abuser will not bear any penalty because a 
protection order is not a self-enforcing mechanism.78 For a 
violation to occur, the victim must report the contact or abuse, 
and a formal arrest must occur.79  
Until recently, police officers have been criticized for their 
inadequate response to calls of domestic abuse and protection 
order violations.80 This lack of officer response largely relied on 
“an unspoken assumption that internal family disputes largely 
fell outside of their area of responsibility.”81 In recent years there 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslie E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection 
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 801, 1095 (1993) (“Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe 
there is no real risk of being arrested . . . . For enforcement to work, the courts 
need to monitor compliance, victims must report violations, and, most of all, 
police, prosecutors, and judges should respond sternly to violations . . . .”). 
 77. See id. (noting that without a report of a violation there is no way for a 
violation to occur). 
 78. See id. (explaining that there is no method for verifying whether an 
abuser has come into contact with the protected party). 
 79. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767 (2005) 
(finding that an individual does not “have a property interest in police 
enforcement of [a] restraining order” and therefore it is up to the discretion of 
the police to enforce the order). 
 80. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 46 (1999) 
(detailing the failed responses of police officers in making arrests, specifically 
noting police training materials which recommended avoiding arrest if possible); 
Eve S. Buzawa & David Hirschel, Evolution of the Police Response to Domestic 
Violence, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 69, 69–70 
(Evan Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds., 2009) (describing the lack of police 
enforcement of domestic abuse situations up until the past 30 years); Damon 
Phillips, Civil Protection Orders: Issues in Obtainment, Enforcement and 
Effectiveness, 61 J. MO. B. 29, 33  (2005) (providing examples of where a police 
officer’s failure to act resulted in drastic consequences). 
 81. Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 80, at 69. 
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has been a shift to better police enforcement, with many states 
now having mandatory-arrest policies for any incident that 
involves domestic abuse.82 Additionally, many officers are now 
better equipped for dealing with a violation of a protection order 
because of increased training and education on enforcing orders.83 
In furtherance of this mission, many states now require the police 
officer to inform the victim of the legal rights and services that 
are available to victims of abuse in their jurisdiction.84 
2. Processing the Violation 
Once a violation has been reported and the abuser has been 
arrested, the violation can result in both civil and criminal 
penalties.85 Civilly, the respondent may be held in contempt of 
court; criminally, the respondent may face criminal penalties 
depending on the state statute.86 In the majority of states, the 
criminal penalty is the primary method for truly penalizing a 
defendant, with “the overwhelming majority treat[ing] the 
                                                                                                     
 82. See A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST 
POLICIES BY STATE (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/domviol/docs/Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.auth
checkdam.pdf (listing each state’s arrest policy, typically having a mandatory 
arrest or pro-arrest policy). 
 83. See NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, 
PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S 
GUIDE TO ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS NATIONWIDE 1–20 (2006), http:// 
www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/files/LawEnforcement_031411_Web.pdf (providing law 
enforcement officers with a pamphlet on the proper process for enforcing a 
protection order). 
 84. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.080 (2012) (“The officer at the scene of an 
alleged incident of abuse shall inform the abused party of available judicial 
remedies for relief from adult abuse and of available shelters for victims of 
domestic violence.”). 
 85. See Robin R. Runge, ABA Standards Safeguard Domestic Violence, 
Sexual Assault, and Stalking Victims, 26 CHILD. L. PRAC. 142, 142 (2007) (“The 
court may order civil remedies including temporary custody, child support, and 
restitution, as well as require the respondent to refrain from further criminal 
contact. Moreover, violations of the order may be criminally or civilly 
enforced.”). 
 86. See id. (explaining possible civil and criminal penalties that may arise 
from the violation of an order). 
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violation as a misdemeanor.”87 For some states, the violation of 
the order is even more serious, resulting in a felony in Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Washington.88  
The victim has two paths she can take to penalize the abuser: 
(1) personally file a form for civil contempt;89 or (2) alert local law 
enforcement of the violation and have the district attorney 
prosecute the violation.90 If the victim chooses the civil path, she 
is responsible for filing the form for civil contempt, where she 
recounts the violation of the order and attaches any police report 
of the violation if available.91 Criminally, a violation will be 
prosecuted if the respondent disobeys the order, and the 
petitioner alerts law enforcement, resulting in the respondent’s 
arrest.92 If a violation occurs without an arrest, the victim can 
                                                                                                     
 87. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND 
THE LAW 541 (Robert C. Clark et al., eds., 2001) (explaining the process for 
enforcing a protection order). 
 88. Id.  
 89. See OR. JUD. DEP’T, WHAT YOU CAN DO WHEN YOUR MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY FAMILY ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) RESTRAINING ORDER HAS BEEN 
VIOLATED 2–5 (rev. ed. 2010), http://courts.oregon.gov/multnomah/docs/ 
FamilyCourt/WhatYouCanDoIfYourRestrainingOrderIsViolated.pdf [hereinafter 
WHAT YOU CAN DO] (providing a step by step instruction of the process for 
punishing a violation of an order for protection in Oregon); A Guide to Protection 
Orders, The Court and Community Resources, COLUMBUS CITY ATTORNEY, 
http://www.columbuscity attorney.org/prosecution-guidetoprotection.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014) (listing the steps that will occur in assessing a violation of 
a protection order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See WHAT YOU CAN DO, supra note 89 (explaining the process of alerting 
law enforcement of a violation and working with them to have the abuser 
penalized). 
 91. Many organizations that protect abused women offer services or online 
instructions to assist these women in filling out the civil contempt form. See 
END VIOLENT ENCOUNTERS, HOW TO FILE A MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE FOR A 
PERSONAL PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATION, http://www.eveinc.org/main/images/ 
ppo/motiontoshowcause.pdf (providing detailed instructions on how to fill out a 
civil contempt form in Michigan). The form is fairly basic, requiring that the 
victim show cause that there was a violation and providing the respondent an 
opportunity to appear in court to demonstrate why they should not be held in 
contempt. See Contempt Citation and Order to Show Cause, STATE OF COLO., 
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=228 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing an example of Colorado’s show cause form 
for contempt of court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 92. See sources cited supra note 89 (offering instructions on how to report a 
violation of a protection order and receive civil and criminal remedies from the 
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reach out to local enforcement or the district attorney to report 
the violation and start the process for prosecution.93 
III. The Injustice of the Current System 
A. Disparity in Enforcement 
While a protection order is traditionally obtained by one 
party against another, the violation of the order does not always 
occur in a simple manner where there is only one-sided contact 
and abuse. Currently, a violation of a protection order places all 
of the emphasis on the abuser’s role in a violation and essentially 
ignores the role of the protected party.94 The majority of courts 
have found that a protected party’s role in the violation of a 
protection order will not be considered, even in cases of mutual 
abuse, placing all the blame on the respondent who violated the 
order.95 This ignorance of the protected party’s role allows the 
victim to use the structure of the order for enticement, rather 
than protection, creating an unintended negative penalty for a 
respondent who is lured into a violation. 
In analyzing mandatory arrest policies, Keith Guzik has 
recognized a trend of women intentionally calling their abusers to 
                                                                                                     
court). 
 93. See sources cited supra note 91 (providing guides on reporting a 
violation of a protection order). 
 94. Many scholars argue that this should always be the case because of the 
fragile situation that women are already in by obtaining a protection order. One 
author, Sally Goldfarb, specifically looked at situations where a victim was 
penalized for her actions in “enticing” her abuser, and characterized this penalty 
as inappropriate because of the difficulties the protected party faces. See Sally 
F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can 
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1487, 1528–29 (2008) (noting the many penalties that a victim might bear 
because of her role in the violation of the protection order). 
 95. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ohio 2003) (illustrating a 
situation where there was mutual abuse, sending the male to the hospital with 
a fractured elbow, and the female with a bruised nose). There is the possibility 
that the woman inflicted these more severe injuries in self-defense, but the facts 
are not clear on that issue. Id; see also City of N. Olmsted v. Bullington, 744 
N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he victim may not be charged as an 
aider and abetter in the violation of a TPO by an offender.”). 
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lure them into violating the order.96 Guzik quoted one prison 
guard stating: “That happens all the time. Girls call a guy over 
when a no-contact order is in effect. He comes over and she calls 
the cops.”97 The circumstances of this type of violation are 
distinctly different from a scenario where the respondent shows 
up uninvited and beats the protected party.98 The law needs to 
provide a mechanism for handling these violations where the 
woman’s role in the violation cannot and should not go unnoticed.  
This problem of disparate treatment also arises where the 
parties have reconciled, no abuse has occurred, the parties have 
not sought legal assistance, and yet, the respondent is still 
charged with a violation. For example, in May of 1998, Frank and 
Laura Bullington were pulled over for a routine traffic violation 
and upon identification of the passengers the police realized that 
Laura had a protection order against her husband.99 Not knowing 
the rules and procedures for protection orders, the police arrested 
both passengers for violation of the order.100 Eventually, the court 
convicted Frank for violating the protection order, but found the 
wife could not be charged with violating the protection order as 
an aider and abetter.101 Here, a violation resulted without a 
report of abuse, and without either party complaining, but only 
the respondent was penalized for the reconciliation of the 
parties.102 Without a legal option to assess these types of 
violations, the court system is neglecting to understand the 
circumstances that lead to the violation and the culpability of the 
parties involved. 
                                                                                                     
 96. See GUZIK, supra note 38, at 44 (exploring the consequences of 
mandatory arrest policies and their reliance on gender stereotypes). 
 97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. The illustrations at the beginning of this Note provide another example 
of a situation where enforcing the violation would conflict with the purpose of 
the order. Supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text. 
 99. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d at 1225. 
 100. Id. at 1226. 
 101. See id. at 1229 (“Here, the victim of a TPO is a member of the protected 
class designated for protection from violent abusers. Consequently, the victim 
may not be charged as an aider and abetter in the violation of a TPO by an 
offender.”). 
 102. Id. 
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A violation of a protection order is a serious offense that can 
result in severe penalties for the respondent.103 While the penalty 
is justified in the majority of cases, there is the small minority of 
cases where courts place the blame on the respondent for 
procedural reasons, rather than the culpability of the individuals.  
B. The Rationale Behind the Protection 
The primary reason for refusing to consider the role of the 
woman in violating a protection order is rooted in the woman’s 
vulnerable mental state in an abusive relationship.104 Lenore 
Walker’s theory on the cycle of abuse highlights the fragile state 
of an abused woman, which divides an abusive relationship into 
three stages: “the tension building phase; the explosive or acute 
battering incident; and the calm loving respite.”105 This cycle 
illustrates the battered woman’s belief that her abuser is going to 
get better, giving her motivation to remain in the abusive 
relationship because of the periods of the cycle where he acts 
affectionately.106 This cycle argues that once a man beats his wife, 
it will almost always happen again, resulting in continued abuse 
and manipulation of the battered woman.107  
In the case of Stevenson v. Stevenson,108 the court relied on 
this pattern of abuse as the reason for denying a victim’s request 
                                                                                                     
 103. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (noting that the typical 
criminal penalty for a violation is a misdemeanor, with some states considering 
the violation a felony). 
 104. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–70 (1979) (explaining 
the cycle of violence and the fragile physical and psychological state that women 
are in). 
 105. Id. at 55. 
 106. See id. at 69 (describing a woman’s tendency to want to continue the 
relationship based on the one phase of the cycle where her abuser treats her 
with love and respect). 
 107. See id. (“Most women report that before they know it, the calm, loving 
behavior gives away to little battering incidents again.”); see also Stevenson v. 
Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) (“A period of relative calm may 
last as long as several months, but in a battering relationship the affection and 
contrition of the batterer will eventually fade, and phases one and two, the 
‘tension-building’ phase and the ‘acute battering incident’ phase, will start 
anew.”). 
 108. 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) (finding that reconciliation of the 
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to remove an order she had received against her abuser.109 The 
court announced that “[a] period of relative calm may last as long 
as several months, but in a battering relationship the affection 
and contrition of the batterer will eventually fade, and phases one 
and two, the ‘tension-building’ phase and the ‘acute battering 
incident’ phase, will start anew.”110 The court then rejected the 
petitioner’s request because the court found that the likelihood of 
further abuse was too great to allow the petitioner to re-enter the 
relationship.111 
Due to the vulnerable relationship that abusive couples face, 
it is not uncommon that both parties will want to reconcile.112 If 
the parties choose to do so, they must receive a formal order from 
the court to remove the preexisting protection order before they 
should take too many steps in continuing their relationship.113 If 
the court decides to remove the protection order, the parties can 
legally reunite; however, if the court decides not to remove the 
order, the parties will be prevented from reconciling.114 For 
                                                                                                     
couple is not sufficient to merit the removal of an order for protection). 
 109. See id.  
When considering a victim’s application to dissolve, and whether 
there is good cause to do so, a court must determine whether objective 
fear can be said to continue to exist, and also whether there is a real 
danger of domestic violence recurring, in the event the restraining 
order is dissolved. 
 110. Id. at 993. 
 111. See id. (finding that a protection order could not be removed because of 
“the uncontroverted evidence of defendant’s brutality against his wife, his 
history of violence both within and without the domestic arena, [and] his alcohol 
abuse and uncontrolled assaultive behavior when under the influence . . . .”). 
 112. See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and 
Understanding? Restorative Justice As a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence 
Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 552–61 (2010) (looking at how 
reconciliation of a couple can be used to the advantage of the domestic violence 
prevention system). 
 113. See Robert F. Friedman, Protecting Victims from Themselves, but Not 
Necessarily from Abusers: Issuing a No-Contact Order over the Objection of the 
Victim Spouse, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235, 245 (2010) (“Prior to the 
expiration of the order . . . the party protected by the order may petition the 
court to vacate the order.”). 
 114. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) 
(finding that the dissolution of an order of protection is up to the discretion of 
the judge and refusing to remove the order even after the petitioner requested 
dissolution); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring 
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example, in the case of Stevenson, the court refused a victim’s 
petition to remove an order of protection in order for the court to 
protect the victim from further abuse, even though she was the 
one who petitioned for the removal of the order.115  
Even without reconciliation, the precarious state of an 
abusive relationship makes it difficult for an abuser to resist the 
persistent contact that a victim might initiate; the abuser may 
reconnect with the victim and fully intend to cease abusing her, 
but the abusive behavior may still recommence.116 The abusers in 
these situations do not deserve to go unpenalized, but they do 
deserve a proper hearing that places some emphasis on the role 
that the victim played in provoking a violation.117  
IV. The Legal System’s Approach to the Problem 
The woman’s role in violating a protection order has not gone 
unnoticed in the legal community, but there is no consensus on 
exactly what type of judicial weight should be given to her 
                                                                                                     
the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 44 (2007) (“The quasi-criminal nature of CPOs, as 
compared with traditional civil injunctions, may cause a judge to take a more 
interventionist, rather than deferential, approach.”). 
 115. See Stevenson, 714 A.2d at 995 (“This court will not be an accomplice to 
further violence by this defendant, by wholly dissolving at this point the 
restraints that have been entered against him. Accordingly, and for lack of good 
cause shown, plaintiff’s application to dissolve the Final Restraining Order is 
denied.”). 
 116. See WALKER, supra note 104, at 55–70 (describing the cycle of abuse 
where a loving relationship turns violent without provocation). 
 117. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1528–29 (describing some court’s 
decisions to consider the woman’s role in the violation, resulting in women being 
“charged as accessories for ‘enticing’ the abuser to violate the order; [and] . . . 
such contact [being] considered . . . a mitigating factor when sentencing the 
abuser on a criminal charge”). Much of the discretion in how to enforce a 
protection order is still left to the judge, and some judges have decided to take it 
into their own hands when they feel that a woman deserves to be penalized for 
her actions in communicating with her abuser. See Francis X. Clines, Judge’s 
Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/08/us/judge-s-
domestic-violence-ruling-creates-an-outcry-in-kentucky.html  (recounting a 
judge’s decision to fine two victims of domestic abuse for ignoring the protection 
orders they had received against their abusers). 
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continued contact with her abuser. In Diane Kiesel’s casebook 
entitled Domestic Violence: Law, Policy, and Practice, she 
recognizes the problem in weighing the woman’s role in the 
violation, but does not provide a solution.118 Kiesel asks the 
question: “[S]hould a judicial sanction be imposed where a victim 
invites her abuser to ignore the protective order and is 
subsequently injured or abused at his hands?”119 Both law 
enforcement and the court system have asked this same question, 
but there is no single answer to how the victim’s role in the 
violation should be treated. 
Some states have attempted to answer this question by 
recognizing and penalizing the woman for her role in the 
respondent’s violation of a protection order in four ways: 
(1) charging the woman as an aider and abetter in the 
violation;120 (2) rendering the order null because of 
reconciliation;121 (3) fining the woman for her continued contact 
with the abuser; 122 and (4) issuing mutual protection orders.123 
The next subparts will look at the application of these methods, 
and some of the criticism surrounding them. 
A. The Protected Party as an Aider and Abetter 
Only a few state courts have addressed the issue of whether 
a petitioner can be charged as an aider and abetter in the 
violation of an order protecting her. In Henley v. Iowa District 
Court for Emmet County,124 the court determined that the 
petitioner’s decision to hide her abuser in her bedroom was too 
                                                                                                     
 118. See KIESEL, supra note 46, at 172 (examining some of the issues that 
are raised by protection orders in the criminal context of the law). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Infra Part IV.A. 
 121. Infra Part IV.B. 
 122. Infra Part IV.C. 
 123. Infra Part IV.D. 
 124. 533 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1995). In Henley, the court found that a 
petitioner in a protection order can be held in contempt of court for assisting her 
abuser in violating a no-contact order. Id. at 199. Henley was then arrested and 
held in contempt for violating the order, and later was put on probation for six 
months. Id.  
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egregious for her to go unpenalized.125 The violation of the order 
occurred after police officers noticed the abuser’s car outside of 
Henley’s house, and went to her door to ensure that everything 
was okay.126 The police officers then conducted a search of the 
home and found Henley’s abuser “under some blankets in the 
bedroom.”127 This Iowa court determined that Henley was an 
accomplice to the violation, and found her in contempt of court for 
her actions.128 Here, the court recognized the need to protect the 
victim of domestic abuse, but also recognized that this victim’s 
actions could not go ignored simply because she was previously 
the victim.129 The court stated, “[a]lthough we are sympathetic to 
Henley’s plight as a victim, her willful disregard for her own 
safety cannot deter us from upholding an enforceable order for 
her protection.”130 This statement highlights the Judiciary’s 
refusal to ignore the actions of the victim in causing a violation of 
an order.131 
Other state courts have taken the opposite approach, 
explicitly rejecting the idea of penalizing the petitioner.132 In 
State v. Lucas,133 an Ohio court decided that the protected party 
is immune from prosecution for complicity.134 The court looked at 
the legislative intent of the statute, and determined that “[t]he 
General Assembly has made an invitation by the petitioner for 
the respondent to violate the terms of a protection order 
irrelevant to a respondent’s guilt.”135 The court recognized that 
the protected party actually inflicted more damage on her 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 201. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 203. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 648 (Ohio 2003) (finding that a 
petitioner can never be convicted of aiding and abetting in the violation of her 
own order).  
 133. 795 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 2003). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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husband than she herself was subject to,136 but determined that 
this fact was irrelevant because of the need to protect the more 
typical situations, where the victim suffers more harm.137 
Moreover, Ohio’s state statute goes even further by explicitly 
stating that “the [protection order] cannot be waived or nullified 
by an invitation to the respondent from the petitioner or other 
family or household member to enter the residence.”138  
Ohio is not alone in its refusal to penalize the victim as an 
aider and abetter in a protection order violation. Indiana courts 
have also determined that an individual cannot be found to have 
aided and abetted in the violation of an order that was 
established for her own protection.139 Because protection orders 
are independently governed by each state’s legislature, these 
differences in state penalties can create problems when the 
protected party crosses state lines.140 Additionally, charging the 
victim as an aider and abetter is one of the most controversial 
aspects of protection orders because of the possible chilling effect 
it could have on the victim reporting the abuse, creating the risk 
of the protection order being deemed useless.141 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. at 647–48 (“[T]his case is different from most. Had Betty Lucas 
not gotten the better of her husband, this case would probably not be here.”). 
 137. See id. at 647 (finding that in a typical protection order violation, the 
“protected party receives the brunt of the injuries”). 
 138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(7)(a) (West 2012). 
 139. See Patterson v. State, No. 34A02–1203–CR–235, 2012 WL 6478364, at 
*3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2012) (finding that the general assembly did not 
intend for the petitioner to be held in violation of the order, even if she invited 
the respondent to come into contact); Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e do not consider whether the victim knowingly ignored the 
protective order but, rather, whether the defendant knowingly violated the 
protective order. The protective order is between [the abuser] and the State, not 
[the abuser] and [the victim].”). 
 140. See infra Part V.D (explaining how protection orders are enforced when 
a protected party crosses state lines). 
 141. See Adam Liptak, Ohio Case Considers Whether Abuse Victim Can 
Violate Own Protective Order, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A18 (quoting 
Cleveland lawyer Alexandria M. Ruden as stating, “[t]his would have an 
absolute chilling effect on domestic violence victims going to the police and going 
to prosecutors” when asked about the effect of a victim being charged with 
aiding and abetting her abuser in violating the order). 
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B. Reconciliation of the Parties 
Some courts looked to remedy the problem by considering the 
reconciliation of the parties as grounds to nullify an existing 
order. In Mohamed v. Mohamed,142 a New Jersey appellate court 
found that, “[t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the 
viability of a domestic violence order” because the parties have 
settled the matter themselves outside the boundaries of the 
law.143  
Although this decision occurred before the passage of New 
Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,144 which 
enhanced the power of law enforcement and the judiciary,145 New 
Jersey has continued to use reconciliation as a consideration in 
determining whether a protection order violation has occurred.146 
In the later New Jersey case, Carfagno v. Carfagno,147 the court 
created eleven factors that can be considered in determining 
whether a respondent’s request for dissolution of a protection 
order should be granted.148 The factors are:  
(1) whether the victim consented to lift the restraining order; 
(2) whether the victim fears the defendant; (3) the nature of 
                                                                                                     
 142. 555 A.2d 696 (N.J. App. Div. 1989). In Mohamed, the court determined 
that a protection order was void because “the domestic violence action [was] 
resolved by the parties, [and] the reconciliation should end the matter[, because 
t]he reconciliation of the parties destroys the viability of a domestic violence 
order.” Id. at 698. 
 143. Id.  
 144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 (West 1991). 
 145. See A.B. v. L.M., 672 A.2d 1296, 1298 (N.J. App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he law 
of domestic violence was substantially revised with the passage of the 1991 Act. 
Police and judicial responsibilities were enhanced . . . .”). 
 146. See 12 N.J. PRAC., FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 47.21 (“A victim who 
reconciles with a defendant adjudicated of having committed domestic violence, 
by resuming their pre-complaint relationship, generally destroys the viability of 
a restraining order and serves as a de facto vacation of the order.”). 
 147. 672 A.2d 751 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995). The court in Carfagno did not 
dissolve the protection order pursuant to the defendant’s petition. See id. at 760 
(applying eleven factors for determining whether a protection order should be 
dissolved per a defendant’s petitioner and finding that the protection order 
should not be dissolved in this case).  
 148. See id. at 756–57 (noting that the factors for consideration “need to be 
weighed qualitatively, and not quantitatively, to determine whether defendant 
has met the required burden”).  
THE ROLE OF ENTICEMENT 1499 
the relationship between the parties today; (4) the number of 
times that the defendant has been convicted of contempt for 
violating the order; (5) whether the defendant has a continuing 
involvement with drug or alcohol abuse; (6) whether the 
defendant has been involved in other violent acts with other 
persons; (7) whether the defendant has engaged in counseling; 
(8) the age and health of the defendant; (9) whether the victim 
is acting in good faith when opposing the defendant’s request; 
(10) whether another jurisdiction has entered a restraining 
order protecting the victim from the defendant; and (11) other 
factors deemed relevant by the court.149 
This test allows New Jersey’s courts to take a complete 
survey of the relationship between the abuser and the protected 
party when assessing the removal of the order.150 Additionally, 
this test allows the respondent to petition the court to have an 
order removed if he feels that the two parties have reconciled and 
should be able to continue their relationship.151 With this test, the 
couple can come back into contact, reconcile, and petition the 
court without the respondent violating the protection order.152 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. Other New Jersey decisions have created factors to consider before 
granting a petition for dissolution because of reconciliation. The factors used in 
Torres v. Lancellotti include:  
1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and 
defendant; . . . 2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 
property; 3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 
defendant; 4) The best interests of the victim and any child; 5) In 
determining custody and visitation the protection of the victim’s 
safety; and 6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from 
another jurisdiction, as well as any proof of changed circumstances 
since the entry of the order.  
Torres v. Lancellotti, 607 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1992). 
 150. See Carfango, 672 A.2d at 756–57 (providing the test for reconciliation 
in New Jersey). 
 151. See id. (noting that this test allows the defendant to petition the court 
for relief as long as he can satisfy the requirements of the test). 
 152. This will help prevent a violation from occurring in situations where no 
abuse was reported, but a violation occurred because of the specific 
circumstances. For example, in the case of Laura and Frank Bullington, neither 
party complained of abuse, rather a police officer discovered the protection order 
when he had the respondent pulled over for a routine traffic violation. City of N. 
Olmstead v. Bullington, 744 N.E.2d 1225, 1225 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). Or, in the 
example where the police officers simply noticed the respondent’s car outside of 
the petitioner’s house and went inside to ensure that everything was okay. 
Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 1995). 
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The test does not remove the possibility of a violation, but instead 
provides a specific method for removing the protection order with 
a proper showing of reconciliation and a rehabilitated 
relationship.153 
C. Fining the Protected Party 
Another approach to remedying the problem of victim 
enticement is to fine the petitioner for her continued contact with 
her abuser. In one Kentucky court the judge did just that, fining 
two women who had taken out protection orders against their 
abusers and then continued to contact them in violation of the 
order.154 The women were fined the small amounts of $100 and 
$200, but the point of the fine was to signal to the women that 
they could not continue to contact their abuser and go 
unpenalized.155 The judge was experienced in the domestic abuse 
docket, and was sick of seeing women who “awake . . . her at 2 
a.m. with pleas for emergency orders. And then, within days . . . 
[come] back in her court—arm in arm with the men they say they 
fear.”156 
This Kentucky court is not the only court that has become fed 
up with petitioners’ tendencies to reconnect with their abusers. In 
North Carolina courts, “some judges have taken to charging 
women a $65 fee if they apply for a protective order then decide to 
drop the matter.”157 The courts argue that the fine forces women 
to seriously consider the consequences of filing a protection order, 
rather than petitioning for an order one day and dropping the 
order the next. In reality, this type of fine creates a substantial 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995) 
(providing the test for reconciliation in New Jersey). 
 154. See Clines, supra note 117 (“‘You can’t have it both ways,’ said Judge 
Megan Lake Thornton of Fayette County District Court in recently fining two 
women $100 and $200 respectively for obtaining protective orders forbidding 
their partners from contacting them, then relenting and contacting the men.”). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Stephanie Simon, Judges Push for Abused to Follow the Law, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/22/news/mn-24141 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 157. Id. 
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disincentive to petitioning for a protection order, and would be 
extremely detrimental to women who are in a manipulative 
relationship and are unsure about how to seek relief. In contrast 
to the fines that the Kentucky judge imposed after the protected 
party came back into contact with her abuser,158 this type of fine 
penalizes the victim before she has done anything deserving of a 
penalty.159 
These fines assessed against the protected party have 
created a strong push from domestic violence advocates to ban 
these types of penalties.160 Although the Kentucky judge saw no 
excuse for the women’s actions, advocates for abused women 
argue that it is not so easy for a woman to simply cut off all 
contact with her abuser, and situational factors complicate the 
party’s prior reliance on each other.161 The executive director of 
the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association argued that simply 
cutting off all contact is impossible because “[t]hey may have 
children in common. It’s pretty hard to say, ‘Never speak again.’ 
People have financial difficulties. They may love the partner. It’s 
not an easy thing.”162 But, this argument only supports 
communications by the victim that have a legitimate purpose—
such as arranging child visitation or bill payment—this does not 
justify communication by the victim that is wrongfully used to 
entice the respondent into a violation. 
Additionally, these arguments made by battered women 
advocates can be easily applied in the reverse direction. When the 
respondent has cut off all contact with the petitioner, he is going 
to have to deal with the same problems of reliance and 
                                                                                                     
 158. See text supra note 154 (assessing fines on women who continued to 
contact their abusers after they received protection orders against the men). 
 159. See text supra note 157 (noting that one court charges a $65 fee when a 
petitioner chooses to drop her petition for a protection order). 
 160. See Clines, supra note 117 (“Judge Thornton’s ruling has alarmed 
advocates for battered women, who plan to appeal it. The advocates say the 
finding goes beyond existing law. . . .”). 
 161. See id. (finding Judge Thorton’s actions “unrealistic because some 
renewed contacts often prove unavoidable in domestic abuse cases, which 
involve economic and family dependency and other complications of daily 
living”). 
 162. Simon, supra note 156. 
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dependence that the female is facing.163 If the petitioner is 
continuing to contact her abuser without penalty, the difficulty is 
amplified, complicating the respondent’s efforts to ignore her 
constant communication.164 Although ending communication is 
difficult, if the party who took the proactive step of petitioning for 
the protection order is simply communicating to entice a violation 
from the respondent, the protection order is transformed from a 
device that protects the victim into a tool that can be used for 
retribution. 
D. Issuing a Mutual Protection Order 
Another legal method for coping with the problem of 
enticement in protection orders is to issue a mutual protection 
order (mutual order), prohibiting both parties from 
communicating with each other.165 These orders prevent the 
woman from enticing her abuser because both parties bear a 
penalty for violating the order if they come into contact, meaning 
she will be in violation of the order as soon as she reaches out to 
the respondent.166 
1. Obtaining a Mutual Protection Order 
Mutual orders come in three main forms: (1) mutual 
petitioning and abuse; (2) mutual finding of abuse without a 
separate petition; and (3) agreement for a mutual order without a 
finding of abuse or separate petition. The first form arises when 
both parties petition the court for a protection order, presenting 
                                                                                                     
 163. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (describing the 
difficulties in completely cutting off communication between the couple). 
 164. See supra note 161 (explaining the domestic advocate’s argument that 
completely ending contact with an abuser is too difficult for the typical battered 
woman). 
 165. See Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of 
Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 
253, 266 (1996) (“A mutual protection order is an order entered against both 
parties, requiring both to abide by the restraints and other forms of relief in the 
civil protection order.”). 
 166. Id. 
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evidence of abuse committed by both parties, and the court later 
issuing an order that prevents either party from making 
contact.167 The second form occurs when one party has petitioned 
the court for an order of protection, but during the trial and 
presentation of facts there is a finding of abuse from both parties, 
resulting in the judge issuing a mutual protection order without a 
petition from both parties.168 The last method arises when the 
victim simply agrees to a mutual order to stay away from the 
abuser, even without a showing of abuse.169 This last form often 
seems the most appealing to the victim at the time but can result 
in the harshest penalties for the victim in the long run because 
she submits herself to civil and criminal liability without having 
committed any abuse.170 
Many states have chosen to explicitly prohibit mutual 
orders,171 only issuing a mutual order when both parties have 
                                                                                                     
 167. See Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective 
Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protection Orders are Not, 67 IND. 
L.J. 1039, 1053–54 (1992) (explaining the process available for attaining a 
mutual order). 
 168. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(18) (2012) (stating that a mutual 
order can be issued if both parties have met their burden of showing abuse and 
the court makes separate findings of fact supporting the issuance of the order); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 209A, § 3 (2012) (“A court may issue a mutual 
restraining order or mutual no-contact order pursuant to any abuse prevention 
action only if the court has made specific written findings of fact.”). 
 169. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining 
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44 (1991) (“[R]ather than face 
custody suits, women accept mutual orders of protection, which are 
inappropriate if the woman has not been violent and can hinder the 
effectiveness of the protective order.”); Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1053 (“Like 
other civil cases, protection orders can be negotiated or ‘settled.’ Battered wives 
can agree to mutual protection orders if they wish.”). This type of mutual order 
has been argued as hindering the effectiveness of the order because a woman 
may be less likely to report an incident of the respondent abusing her because of 
her fear that she will be held in violation of the order as well. Id. 
 170. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1055 (“[V]ictims do not often oppose 
[mutual] orders. They will agree to a mutual order for several reasons. They 
may want to expedite the process, cooperate with the lawyer and the judge, and 
avoid violent reactions from their abusers.”). 
 171. See A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STATES PERMITTING OR 
PROHIBITING MUTUAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS WITHOUT A SEPARATE PETITION  (2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Prohibiting
MutualProtectiveOrdersJuly2007.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter STATES 
PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS] (listing California, Colorado, Idaho, 
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separately petitioned the court for relief.172 In contrast, some 
states still allow mutual orders to be entered without a petition 
for relief if the judge determines both parties acted as the 
aggressor.173 For example, Maryland allows mutual orders “if the 
judge makes a detailed finding of fact that . . . both parties acted 
primarily as aggressors; and . . . neither party acted primarily in 
self-defense.”174 Currently, nine states allow mutual orders, 
twelve states are silent on mutual orders, and thirty states 
expressly prohibit mutual orders without a separate petition.175 
2. The Problems with Mutual Protection Orders 
Previously, mutual orders were used as a common tool for 
preventing abuse,176 but significant scholarship and research has 
                                                                                                     
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Washington as offering some form of a mutual protection order). 
 172. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/215 (2012) (“Mutual orders of protection are 
prohibited.”); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-14 (2012) (“A court may not grant a mutual 
order for protection to opposing parties.”); IOWA CODE § 236.20 (2012) (“A court 
in an action under this chapter shall not issue mutual protective orders against 
the victim and the abuser unless both file a petition requesting a protective 
order.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2012) (“No protection from abuse order 
shall be entered against the plaintiff unless: (1) The defendant properly files a 
written cross or counter petition seeking such a protection order.”); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 403.735 (West 2011) (“A court may issue mutual protective orders 
only if a separate petition is filed by the respondent.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, 
§ 4007 (2012) (“The court may not issue a mutual order of protection or 
restraint.”). 
 173. See STATES PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 171 
(providing which states allow mutual orders). 
 174. MD. CODE. ANN, Fam. Law § 4-506 (2012); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 39-6306 (2012) (“In providing relief under this chapter, the court may realign 
the designation of the parties as ‘petitioner’ and ‘respondent’ where the court 
finds that the original petitioner is the abuser and the original respondent is the 
victim of domestic violence.”). 
 175. See STATES PERMITTING MUTUAL PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 171 
(providing which states allow mutual orders). 
 176. Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of 
Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 839–40 (2004) (“Previously, it had 
been common practice for some courts to issue ‘mutual’ protection orders that 
required both parties to stay away from each other and adhere to other 
conditions without making any findings of fact or even requiring the respondent 
 
THE ROLE OF ENTICEMENT 1505 
illustrated the negative effects that the orders have on the 
petitioner, creating a shift away from their use.177 One of the 
strongest arguments against mutual protection orders is the due 
process concern inherent in a mutual protection order.178 
Elizabeth Topliffe has argued that mutual protection orders 
violate due process because the woman’s right to be free from 
unnecessary restraint is infringed when a judge issues a mutual 
order without a mutual showing of abuse.179 Another argument 
against mutual orders is the placement of blame on the victims of 
abuse, which can create issues of further abuse because the 
abuser feels that the court has justified his actions by penalizing 
the victim.180 Lastly, because of the lack of evidence necessary to 
issue a mutual order, it is believed that they can be issued hastily 
and without discretion, resulting in the woman’s rights being 
restricted unnecessarily.181 These procedural and social concerns 
                                                                                                     
to file a petition against the original petitioner.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Jennifer P. Hanft, What’s Really the Problem with Mutual 
Protection Orders, WYO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 23 (arguing that mutual protection 
orders are more dangerous than having no order at all); Phillips, supra note 80, 
at 34–36 (examining the many drawbacks related to mutual protection orders); 
Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1053–64 (looking at the negative repercussions of 
mutual protection orders). 
 178. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1056–60 (describing the probability that 
mutual protection orders violate due process and citing state court decisions 
that have found a violation of due process). 
 179. See id. at 1060 (“[J]udges and lawyers must educate themselves 
regarding the procedural due process issues implicated by mutual protection 
orders. Once lawyers and judges become educated they can prevent these 
violations of procedural due process.”); see also FitzGerald v. FitzGerald, 406 
N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the lower court erred in 
issuing a mutual protection order when there was no evidence of abuse on the 
part of the petitioner); Deacon v. Landers, 587 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1990) (holding that appellant was denied due process when a mutual order was 
issued against her without providing her an opportunity to cross examine or 
present evidence). 
 180. See Phillips, supra note 80, at 35 (“[T]he issuance of a mutual order of 
protection without specific findings may imply to an already troubled victim 
that he or she was partially at fault for the abuse. A mutual order of protection 
may also bolster an abuser’s belief that he is not at fault.”). 
 181. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society’s 
Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 990 
(2011) (describing mutual orders as “highly controversial because they may be 
issued hastily and without evidence, or may restrict parties who were merely 
violent in self-defense”). 
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regarding mutual orders have produced a general aversion to 
mutual orders, preventing them from being an adequate solution 
to the problem of unjust enforcement of protection orders.182 
V. Preventing the Victim from Enticing Her Abuser 
While some states are using these legal options to provide a 
barrier to unjust enforcement, the legal system can do more to 
protect these men who do not always deserve punishment for 
their actions.183 The previous approaches are not applied with 
any consistency, failing to notify both the petitioner and 
respondent of what the repercussions of their actions might be. A 
more unified and reliable approach to the rare circumstances 
where the respondent is enticed into contact will result in an 
equitable result for both parties; preventing the petitioner from 
receiving a penalty she did not know existed, and avoiding the 
unnecessarily penalization of a blameless respondent.  
This subpart proposes three solutions that provide a 
circumstantial approach to violations, as opposed to the 
automatic punishment system that is currently in place in most 
jurisdictions. The proposals are provided in the order of weakest 
to strongest, ending with the proposal that is most effective 
remedy to the issue of enticement. The first proposal is a uniform 
fining system that would discourage the protected party from 
contacting their abuser unnecessarily.184 Second, this Note will 
propose a mediation system that parties can choose in lieu of 
receiving an order for protection.185 While these first two 
proposals seem appealing at first glance, the solutions are 
actually an ineffective response to the problem posed by this 
Note, which will be highlighted when explaining the proposals.186 
The third argument is the strongest solution to the problem of 
                                                                                                     
 182. See supra note 177 (providing resources that are strongly opposed to 
mutual orders and their effect on abused women). 
 183. See supra Part IV (explaining the existing legal options protecting the 
restrained party from being enticed by the petitioner). 
 184. Infra Part V.A. 
 185. Infra Part V.B. 
 186. Infra Part V.A–B. 
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victim enticement.187 This subpart advocates for remedying the 
problem of enticement at the back end, through the use of a 
factor-based approach to protection order violations,188 along with 
issuing mutual protection orders once the victim has enticed her 
abuser into contact.189 The final subpart of this section will 
advocate for uniform application of these rules in order for the 
problem of disparate enforcement to be fully addressed.190 
A. Implementing a Fining System 
The first proposal is to create a fining system that is a 
component of each protection order issued that discourages 
victims from enticing their abuser back into contact.191 Similar to 
Judge Thorton’s sanctions, a fining system would make the 
victim aware that she should not be contacting her abuser, 
without imposing too severe of a penalty on the victim.192 Fining 
the victim for repeated contact is not an uncommon occurrence in 
the court system, but because no state includes this penalty in 
their statutes for protection orders, the penalty usually comes up 
without the victim knowing that she had done anything that 
could be penalized.193  
With the application of this penalty, along with a process for 
informing the petitioner of the possible fine, a victim would be 
less likely to contact her abuser for mere enticement purposes, 
and would be able to work towards ending communication with 
                                                                                                     
 187. Infra Part V.C. 
 188. Infra Part V.C.1. 
 189. Infra Part V.C.2.  
 190. Infra Part V.D. 
 191. This penalty may implicate some of the same arguments that are made 
against mutual orders, primarily that the victim is being penalized without 
having done anything. See supra Part IV.D.2 (noting some of the criticisms of 
mutual orders and their negative impact on victims of domestic violence). 
 192. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (providing Judge 
Thorton’s decision to fine two victims of domestic violence for continuing to 
contact their abuser). 
 193. See supra Part IV.C (providing examples of judges that have fined the 
victim of a protection order because of their continued contact with their 
abuser). 
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her abuser all together. To avoid too severe of a penalty, a system 
could be imposed where the fine does not result until the 
respondent has provided evidence that the petitioner has 
contacted him more than once.  
This solution is the weakest proposal because it brings up 
some of the arguments that are made against treating the victim 
as an aider and abetter194 or penalizing the respondent by 
issuing a mutual protection order.195 Many advocates for 
battered women are strongly opposed to the victim being 
penalized for any of her actions because she is not the party who 
committed the abuse in the first place, and creating this later 
penalty discourages the battered woman from seeking 
protection.196 Although some jurisdictions have already 
implemented this type of monetary penalty, another option that 
does not place blame on the petitioner would be more accepted 
by the legal community.197 
B. Providing Mediation Rather than an Order 
Protection orders frequently end because the parties involved 
decide to reconcile. This reconciliation often results because the 
woman never wanted to have a complete prohibition on contact 
with her abuser, but obtained the protection order in an effort to 
end the abuse.198 The majority of courts refuse to allow couples in 
abusive relationships to have it both ways, meaning they are not 
going to step in to police the relationship, and still allow the 
                                                                                                     
 194. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (arguing that charging the 
victim as an aider and abetter in a violation would have a chilling effect on 
victims seeking relief). 
 195. See supra Part IV.D.2 (highlighting the negative effects of mutual 
orders including due process concerns and the risk that the victim will feel that 
her abuser’s actions are justified). 
 196. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (arguing that a woman 
should not be penalized for any contact she might make with her abuser because 
of her precarious mental and physical state). 
 197. Supra note 157. 
 198. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1512 (explaining the difficulty in 
maintaining a couple’s relationship once a domestic abuse charge occurs). 
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couple to live together.199 Because of this approach, a woman who 
simply wants a prohibition on further abuse—rather than ending 
the relationship—may not be able to do so; and is forced to obtain 
a protection order completely barring contact.200 In a Wisconsin 
study designed to determine victim satisfaction with protection 
orders, the protection orders issued against the victim’s wishes 
were more likely to be violated by the victims themselves than 
the orders where the victim was supportive.201 If a woman does 
not support the order she obtains, she is unlikely to stop 
contacting her abuser, possibly leading to the types of provoked 
violations that this Note addresses. 
In contrast to simply issuing an order of protection, many 
scholars have argued that mediation provides a legal alternative 
that is beneficial to both parties in working to end the abuse, 
without completely ending the relationship.202 The Mediation and 
Restorative Justice Centre, located in Edmonton, Alberta, 
Canada has been developing a mediation program that works to 
protect the victim while facilitating the best result for the couple 
as a whole.203 The mediation process is divided into three steps, 
                                                                                                     
 199. See id. at 1550 (explaining the court’s trend towards dissolving a 
relationship rather than working to fix the relationship for the benefit of both 
parties); see also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994–95 (N.J. Ch. 1998) 
(refusing to grant the victim’s request that a protection order be removed, even 
when she was the one petitioning the court for removal). 
 200. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1505 (“[A] battered woman who wants 
to obtain a protection order designed to end the violence but not the relationship 
may be unable to do so.”). 
 201. See id. at 1512 (“According to the Wisconsin study, women were at 
higher risk for non-compliance with the protection order if they did not want to 
end the relationship or were ambivalent about it. Much of the non-compliance 
took the form of violations of prohibitions on contact.”). 
 202. See Lauren K. Williams, The Use of Mediation as a Complement to the 
Integrated Domestic Violence Courts of New York, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 713, 737 (2012) (“[M]any victims have been frustrated with the process 
of seeking an order of protection and the public nature of the courtroom 
experience, and might be interested in mediation, if it was an option.”). 
 203. See ALAN EDWARDS & JENNIFER HASLETT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE 1 (2003), http://www.voma.org/ 
docs/DVandRJPaper2003.pdf (“The Victim Offender Mediation (VOM) program 
of the Mediation and Restorative Justice Centre (MRJC) . . . has been 
conducting restorative dialogue sessions with domestic violence victims and 
offenders since 1998.”); see also Williams, supra note 202, at 723–24 (explaining 
the process that is used in the Centre’s domestic violence mediation program). 
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allowing the greatest protection for the victim and the possibility 
of a positive outcome.204 The steps consist of: (1) an independent 
meeting with each party “in order to determine that the 
mediation can be done safely;” (2) a meeting where both parties 
are present to discuss the problems facing the couple, and a 
solution is reached; and (3) a second series of independent 
meetings to ensure that both parties are independently happy 
with the results of the mediation.205 
This process provides a remedy for victims who want to 
maintain their relationship with their abuser, but need a legal 
mechanism to prevent the abuse from continuing.206 A protection 
order provides a limited number of legal remedies that are not 
always tailored to the victim’s needs; in contrast, many scholars 
argue that “mediation allows the parties to structure the 
solutions themselves and to create solutions that would be 
unavailable through the court process.”207 If the parties are 
unable to reach an agreement in the mediation session provided, 
the victim still has the option of appearing in court to receive a 
formal protection order to prevent further abuse.208  
While these scholars and the Mediation and Restorative 
Justice Centre have worked to make mediation a viable option, 
this is an unrealistic approach to attacking abuse in the United 
States. Specifically, scholars have noted the extreme unreliability 
that mediation provides a couple in an abusive relationship,209 
and the extensive levels of training and enforcement that would 
be required by this type of system.210 Even advocates who support 
                                                                                                     
 204. Williams, supra note 202, at 723. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 724 (“Victims may not want their abusers go to jail or leave 
the home they share; such measures are the two most common punishments 
meted by the courts. The parties’ perception as to what will work best for them 
may differ from the judge’s perspective . . . .”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. at 730–32 (providing the multistep process that should be used 
to determine whether victims should mediate or choose another legal route). 
 209. See Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and 
Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of Creating Effective Screens, 39 FAM. 
L.Q. 53, 58 (2005) (explaining the difficulty in constructing screens to keep 
certain abusive relationships out of mediation). 
 210. See Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence 
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the use of mediation have noted that “[v]ictims of domestic 
violence who have experienced a ‘culture of battering’ . . . 
characterized by forms of physical, emotional, sexual, familial 
and/or financial abuse . . . are in virtually all instances, not 
appropriate candidates for mediation.”211 Because of the volatile 
relationship between abusive couples, mediation will likely only 
provide a temporary remedy, with inevitable relapse in many 
scenarios. If the court is going to intervene into an abusive 
relationship, it cannot afford to adopt a system that has a high 
possibility of relapse, leaving the woman in a vulnerable position 
for additional abuse.  
Additionally, scholars against the use of mediation have 
highlighted that “[m]ediation is never considered . . . in criminal 
cases. Therefore it should not be considered in domestic violence 
cases.”212 Because of the protection order’s character as a civil 
remedy with criminal penalties, the approach that is used in 
criminal cases should be equally applied to the civil realm of a 
protection order.213 While mediation seems appealing at first 
glance, the unreliability of the protection that is provided is not 
an effective solution to the problem of victim enticement. 
C. Providing a Remedy at the Back End of Enticement 
1. A Factor-Based Approach 
Another solution to the problem of unjust enforcement is to 
create a factor-based approach to assessing violations of an order. 
This approach would allow the court to consider the 
circumstances leading to the violation, helping to prevent the 
                                                                                                     
Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 259 (2002) (“Due to poor screening for 
domestic violence, the absence of legislative mandates for mediator training, 
and the inevitable re-privatization of domestic violence which will set back the 
legislative progress achieved by the battered women’s movement, mediation 
continues to be an inadequate response to family issues.”). 
 211. Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 209, at 58. 
 212. Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic Violence, 
26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559, 572 (2002). 
 213. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (noting that a protection 
order has both civil and criminal penalties). 
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type of disparity in enforcement that was illustrated by Eric 
Nolen’s and Mark Hunt’s cases at the beginning of this Note.214 
Similar to the test used in Carfagno v. Carfagno, the courts 
would apply this test when assessing a protection order violation, 
allowing the court to consider not only the positive circumstances 
of the violation, but also any negative factors that should be 
considered, such as the history of violations and abuse.215 With 
this type of test, cases where the restrained party contacted the 
protected party out of necessity—such as having to take her to 
the hospital—would not necessarily be penalized because the 
circumstances of the violation would be considered in assessing 
the penalty.216  
Many states already have a system of mitigating and 
aggravating factors in their criminal system that are used when 
assessing what penalty will be imposed once an individual has 
been convicted of a certain crime.217 These factors are applied 
differently in each state, but they allow the court to consider the 
circumstances surrounding the crime when determining the 
proper penalty for the defendant.218 For example, under South 
Carolina’s factors for mitigation of criminal sexual conduct, the 
court considers: the defendant’s prior history; the defendant’s 
state of mind; whether the defendant was under duress or 
                                                                                                     
 214. See supra Part I (providing two illustrations of violations of protection 
orders that arose from very different circumstances). 
 215. See Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1995) 
(applying eleven factors for determining whether a protection order should be 
dissolved per a defendant’s petition and finding that the protection order should 
not be dissolved in this case).  
 216. See State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2012) (finding Mark Hunt violated the protection order his wife had against him 
for driving her to the hospital when she had pneumonia). 
 217. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors for Kidnapping, 0030 
SURVEYS 29 (Westlaw) (providing references for each state’s factors that are 
considered when sentencing an individual for kidnapping); Aggravating and 
Mitigating Factors for Sex Crimes, 0030 SURVEYS 31 (Westlaw) (providing 
references for each state’s factors that are considered when sentencing an 
individual for sexual assault). 
 218. See Aggravating and Mitigating Factors for Kidnapping, supra note 217 
(“Jurisdictions vary on how aggravating and mitigating factors are applied (i.e.: 
moving the sentence within an already defined statutory high and low or 
allowing the sentence to move beyond the scope of the statutorily mandated 
range).”). 
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domination by another person; and factors that would reduce the 
defendant’s level of culpability.219 These factors easily translate to 
the context of protection order violations, and when applied in 
conjunction with the factors created by the reconciliation tests, 
the current issue of the victim enticing her abuser is 
diminished.220  
Rather than applying these factors at the sentencing phase of 
the hearing, the factors should be applied at the stage when the 
court is determining whether the individual has violated the 
order in the first place.221 Similar to the defense of consent in 
rape cases, these factors would consider the circumstances of the 
violation and the role that the victim played in enticing her 
abuser into contact.222 Even if the victim was not intentionally 
enticing her abuser, the circumstances of her contact may have 
made it very difficult for the restrained party to not reach out to 
the victim.223 With this factor based approach, a restrained party 
                                                                                                     
 219. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2012)  
(b) Mitigating circumstances: (i) The defendant has no significant 
history of prior criminal convictions involving the use of violence 
against another person. (ii) The crime was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional 
disturbance. (iii) The defendant was an accomplice in the crime 
committed by another person and his participation was relatively 
minor. (iv) The defendant acted under duress or under the 
domination of another person. (v) The capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (vi) The age or 
mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. (vii) The 
defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime. 
These South Carolina factors are meant to provide a model for the development 
of factors for the domestic violence context. In order for this to be applied in the 
protection order context, a new set of factors would need to be developed, with 
the woman’s role in the violation being one of the necessary considerations. 
 220. See Carfagno, 672 A.2d at 760 (applying eleven factors for determining 
whether a protection order should be dissolved per a defendant’s petition and 
finding that the protection order should not be dissolved in this case). 
 221. See supra notes 217–20 (providing examples of factors that can be 
considered in evaluating a protection order violation).  
 222. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 84 (2013) (explaining how consent works as a 
defense to rape). 
 223. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, No. 106,296, 2012 WL 3966535, at *1 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2012) (finding Mark Hunt violated the protection order his wife had 
against him for driving her to the hospital when she had pneumonia); State v. 
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would be able to offer evidence supporting his reason for violating 
the order, while still allowing the court to consider any 
aggravating factors such as prior incidents of abuse, or 
manipulation of the victim.224 
2. Issuing Mutual Protection Orders Post-Enticement 
Another option for providing a solution after the victim has 
been active in contacting her abuser is to provide an option for a 
one-sided protection order to be transformed into a mutual 
order.225 This remedy would allow the court to create an order 
preventing communication from both parties if the court finds 
that the victim has been consistently contacting her abuser with 
the intent to induce a violation.  
This solution removes the due process concern that arises 
when a mutual order is issued.226 As discussed previously, 
scholars are concerned that the issuance of a mutual order 
infringes on a woman’s right to be free from unnecessary 
restraint when she did not do anything worthy of punishment.227 
When a mutual order is issued after the woman has attempted to 
entice her abuser, the woman has been given the opportunity to 
be free from restraint, but has lost this option because of her 
consistent contact with her abuser in hopes of inducing a 
violation. Issuing a mutual order on the back end removes the 
problem of inducement, while preventing the unnecessary 
punishment of a victim before she has done anything wrong. 
                                                                                                     
Lucas, 795 N.E.2d 642, 642 (Ohio 2003) (noting that the petitioner of the 
protection order invited her abuser over to celebrate their mutual son’s 
birthday). 
 224. See supra note 217 (providing examples of mitigating and aggravating 
factors in kidnapping and sexual assault cases). 
 225. See supra Part IV.D.1–2 (explaining a mutual order). 
 226. See Topliffe, supra note 167, at 1056–60 (arguing that mutual orders 
violate due process and citing state court decisions that have found a mutual 
order to be a violation of due process). 
 227. See id. (“[I]ssuing mutual orders without hearing evidence is arguably a 
violation of due process, especially when the respondent does not request a 
mutual order.”). 
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D. Uniform Application of the Remedies 
Regardless of the path chosen to remedy the problem of 
disparate enforcement, the solution needs to have uniform 
application across the states in order to be effective. While there 
is the obvious argument for uniform application in order to 
provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people, 
there is another argument rooted in interstate treatment of 
protection orders that is more crucial to the solution. To 
understand this argument, it is important to first understand 
how full faith and credit is applied to protection orders.  
Full faith and credit plays a crucial role in providing 
protection to the victim of abuse when she crosses over state 
lines. Once a protection order is in place, many victims remain 
fearful of their abuser and choose to relocate across state lines to 
avoid additional contact with their abuser.228 State law governs 
the enforcement of protection orders,229 but federal law ensures 
that the order will be given full faith and credit when a victim 
decides to make the move across state lines.230 In 1994, Congress 
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),231 requiring all 
states to give full faith and credit to protection orders issued by 
sister states.232 The text of VAWA reads:  
Any protection order issued . . . shall be accorded full faith and 
credit by the court of another State, Indian tribe, or territory 
(the enforcing State, Indian tribe, or territory) and enforced by 
the court and law enforcement personnel of the other State, 
Indian tribal government or Territory as if it were the order of 
the enforcing State or tribe.233 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a 
Battered Women Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 999–
1000 (2007) (“Although some domestic violence agencies disavow the idea of an 
‘underground railroad’ for battered women, it is undeniable that women flee 
from their abusers and attempt to keep their whereabouts hidden.”). 
 229. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (providing the requirements 
for obtaining a protection order in each state). 
 230. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) (providing the requirements for a 
protection order to be given full faith and credit). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. § 2265(a). 
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In application, when a victim crosses over state lines, the 
protection afforded by her protection order carries over with her 
into the new state, even without choosing to register the order 
with the state.234 If the woman chooses to register the protection 
order with the state, the state is forbidden from notifying the 
responding party of the order’s registration in the new state.235 
No state requires an order to be registered with the enforcing 
state, but registration is beneficial in preparing enforcement 
officers for a possible violation, and makes it possible for the 
order to be enforced without the victim having to present the 
order to the enforcement officer.236 Additionally, having the order 
registered with the state allows the victim to confirm with local 
authority that all the required elements are met for enforcement 
to occur.237 Another state’s order will be presumed valid if “it has 
the correct names of the parties, has not expired, and is signed by 
an issuing authority.”238 Once the validity of the protection order 
is determined, the officer is obligated to enforce all of the order’s 
terms as issued, but will use the enforcing state’s procedures for 
enforcing the order.239 
                                                                                                     
 234. See id. § 2265(d)(2) (“No prior registration or filing as prerequisite for 
enforcement. Any protection order that is otherwise consistent with this section 
shall be accorded full faith and credit, notwithstanding failure to comply with 
any requirement that the order be registered or filed in the enforcing State, 
tribal, or territorial jurisdiction.”). 
 235. See id. § 2265(d)(1) (“A State . . . shall not notify or require notification 
of the party against whom a protection order has been issued that the protection 
order has been registered or filed in that enforcing State . . . unless requested to 
do so by the party protected under such order.”). 
 236. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES, supra note 29 
(advising victims crossing over state lines to “get certified copies of [the] 
protection order and carry at least one copy . . . at all times. . . [and p]rovide 
copies of the protection order to any law enforcement agency that you may ask 
to enforce your protection order”). 
 237. See id. (advising the victim to register her order in order to ensure 
adequate enforcement of the order). 
 238. NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, FULL FAITH 
AND CREDIT: ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS, http://www.bwjp.org/files/ 
bwjp/files/PocketGuide_forWeb.pdf. 
 239. See id. (“A responding officer must enforce the terms and conditions of 
the order as written by the issuing jurisdiction. . . . [The order] should be 
enforced pursuant to departmental policy and the laws of the enforcing 
jurisdiction.”). 
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Because of this application of full faith and credit to 
protection orders, without a uniform application of the remedies, 
a protected party would be able to cross state lines to avoid the 
remedies or penalties offered in her own state, and still get the 
enforcement from the new state.240 For example, if the fining 
system did not exist universally, the penalty assessed to the 
fleeing petitioner would vary based on which state she is in. With 
a universal system, every state would mete out a penalty for the 
victim’s repeated contact with her abuser, and there would be no 
excuse for a woman to claim that she did not know that her 
actions would bear a penalty. Creating a uniform system of any of 
the proposed remedies allows for an adequate response to this 
disparate enforcement, while also reducing the confusion that the 
petitioner or respondent may incur when trying to determine how 
the protection order will be applied. 
VI. Conclusion 
The law of domestic violence has evolved in the past few 
decades to provide the maximum protection to the victims of 
abuse, which typically requires the dissolution of the 
relationship.241 Although domestic violence is stereotypically a 
crime against women, recent studies have shown that abuse 
between couples is increasingly mutual, making it difficult to 
determine who should be the restrained party in the typical 
protection order scenario.242 With these changes in the roles that 
parties in an abusive relationship play, there is a need to 
recognize the circumstances surrounding a violation, and, most 
importantly, the role that the protected party plays in the 
violation.243  
                                                                                                     
 240. See supra Part V.A–C (providing the proposed remedies). 
 241. See Goldfarb, supra note 94, at 1550 (“More recently, the law has 
offered victims legal relief, but the relief generally requires ending the 
relationship.”). 
 242. See supra notes 8–9 (referencing recent findings that women are more 
likely to be the perpetrator of abuse and a growing trend of mutual abuse in 
domestic abuser relationships). 
 243. See supra notes 8–9 (noting the changing social norms of protection 
orders, including same sex domestic abuse, and increased frequency of the male 
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A violation that occurs when a man is driving his wife to the 
hospital is not equivalent to a situation where a man shows up at 
his victim’s house and severely beats her.244 The law needs to 
provide a mechanism to distinguish between these two scenarios, 
ensuring that punishment occurs when it is deserved, rather than 
as an automatic penalty to contact. The strongest avenue for 
providing a solution is to create mechanisms that come into effect 
at the back end of a violation, stepping in to protect the 
respondent when the victim’s actions have undermined the 
purpose of the protection order.245 With changes to the system of 
protection order issuance and enforcement, the system will be 
able to provide a remedy to individuals in an abusive relationship 
that provides the victim protection, while preventing the victim 
from abusing the purpose of the order. 
                                                                                                     
being the victim of abuse). 
 244. See supra Part I (comparing two disparate situations of domestic abuse 
and the resulting penalties). 
 245. See supra Part V.C (advocating for a system that would consider the 
role of the woman’s enticement after the violation has been reported). 
